I am writing to you concerning the 12-year
BBC public cover-up of Aerotoxic Syndrome.
On 21st April 2008 BBC
Panorama broadcast ‘Something in the air’ a 30 minute programme which
featured Norfolk based BAe 146 pilot Captain Julian Soddy of BALPA (British
Airline Pilot Association) and British passengers including children as representatives
of a group of around 40 passengers from flight XLA 120 on 1st
February 2007 whose health had all been seriously affected by repeated and
one-off exposures to toxic cabin air. (See ‘Great Victory’ legal article.)
As the soon to be recognised term of Aerotoxic
Syndrome, which was first defined in 1999 after a decade of research by a US
doctor and scientists from France & Australia, was deliberately omitted
from the Panorama programme. The date of 21st April 2008 can be
taken as the formal start of a general BBC cover-up about a known cause of mass
chronic public ill health.
The BBC cover-up has had a profoundly
bad effect both on my company the Aerotoxic Association Ltd. which was founded on
19th March 2007 but more seriously, the health and well-being of the
flying British public who pay their BBC licence fees. The Aerotoxic ‘cover-up’
was formally identified by Christopher Booker in The Daily Telegraph on 24th
June 2007. (See: Pilots disabled by poisoned air article.)
Due to the BBC’s (specifically BBC
Norfolk) deliberate policy of ignoring all previous Aerotoxic Association media
releases & scientific evidence since 2013; along with a 5 year lack of acknowledgement
of formal correspondence from Norwich South MP Clive Lewis I relocated my
company to the European continent on 25th September 2019.
(See: Example Media Release Part 7).
The Aerotoxic Association Ltd. company will
now prosper as the known international solutions are commercially available and
further European continental research into aerotoxic syndrome is progressing rapidly
and continues post Brexit.
We all have a public duty to expose
known public criminal wrong doing and I am writing to you now as BBC Radio 4
‘File on 4’ are allegedly preparing a latest update for the public about Toxic
Cabin Air on 25th February 2020 and it would appear reasonable for
the BBC to inform the British public of the final outcome of the ‘Great
Victory’ legal case of the ‘Aerotoxic poisoning’ of flight XLA 120, as claimed
by passengers specialist aviation lawyers.
The BBC journalists most familiar with
this story are Carole Walker, Robby West & Melissa Rudd.
I am writing to confirm that both I and
my Aerotoxic spokesman Norfolk based Captain Peter Lawton are freely available
to be interviewed live on national BBC and Radio Norfolk or Look East for no
fee, along with other UK experts about the developing story of Aerotoxic
We look forward to your early response
on this hidden H&S matter, which should be in the public interest and by e
mail only please.
Chairman & Founder Aerotoxic Association
Former BAe 146 Training Captain
Cc Lady Mar
Professor/Dr Ian Gibson Co Director
Aerotoxic Association Ltd.
Captain Peter Lawton
Encs: Daily Telegraph article – 24.06.07 Stewarts Law XLA flight 120 Aerotoxic Poisoning – 03.05.10 Aerotoxic Association Ltd. Media Release 01.02.20
This letter was received by hand by the BBC Jane Le Grice at The Forum, Norwich on 10 February 2020.
It has been long
accepted and admitted that compressed air from jet engines has been
contaminated with engine oil which contains many harmful chemicals including
VOC’s and Organo phosphate substances which are universally accepted to be
harmful to health with well known symptoms.
The UK Government
has been aware and discussing the problem for a number of years whilst the vast
majority of the public and medical profession remain completely unaware of
scale and extent of the problem.
As a result of 27
pilots blood and fat being tested in March – May of 2006 with associated memory
and cognitive function tests carried out at the same time by UCL (University
College London) it has revealed shocking and incontrovertible evidence that
there is a serious health hazard for anybody who flies in these aeroplanes;
especially the crews and is therefore a serious flight safety issue. The report
will be available from May 22nd 2006 but may be restricted in its
distribution for obvious reasons.
Other people known to
be probably effected are the entire Royal family and senior members of the
Government who have flown on the BAe 146 for the last twenty years and can not
have escaped the same contamination.
The BAe 146 and
Boeing 757 are well known for being the worst offenders of commercial
airliners, possibly due to sharing a similar make of APU or Auxiliary Power
Unit and its use on the ground.
There have been many
incidents and fatal accidents attributed to ‘fatigue’ and ‘pilot error’ on the
BAe 146 and B. 757 over the years but never any suggestion that contaminated
air is fundamentally to blame.
I wish to make it
clear that due to intense covering up of the phenomenon over the past ten years
or more it is now my duty to point out that any accident in the future should
be regarded as probably being caused by this effect and for any suggestion that
it is not a factor to be subject of a criminal enquiry and manslaughter charges
for those people denying the link.
Q. Xxx, Are you still looking for good stories? John
A. yes thanks John. Hope you and yours are OK
Q. I’m OK thanks and i’m glad you are too. I’ve been evacuated to the country so just like WW2! Did you get a chance to read the Booker article above from 2007? (sent on 8 January 2020)
Ah back in Blighty.
And everyone is wearing masks now. I have heard some horror stories about how
different airlines treated their crew through this crisis
Q. Yes I’m back due to you know what, but on my 5 month time in Europe got all the hot poop. So I’m still dealing with the horror story of Aerotoxic and got a second book about to be published etc but it’s the Cover-up I’m interested in. Do you know how many of the public have AS in Europe alone as I’ve got a published paper which gives numbers. Guess how many? D
A. No idea? Is the research by Dr Mulder?
Q. Well the UK # is in the Booker article from 2007 and the ‘new’ # from Dr Mulder 2017 – check the 2007 number and then i’ll send the paper and latest Europe estimate…OK?
A. Can’t read bookers article as I’ve got my telegraph limit but I do remember it and can’t recall a number for passengers with as
Q. I’ll send it as i’ve got it in Word, have i got your e mail?
Found it and sent 2 –
let me know the # of passengers….
Sunday 5 April 2020
OK XXX, Time up did you
find that figure as here is the news from the US and i know how the case ended
up, can you let me know if you can cover as i’ve got another person in mind
Emergency BLOG – 5 April 2020 @ 1100 UTC/1200 BST.
MayDay, Mayday’ is the internationally recognised procedure for getting instant
attention and absolute time priority for any emergency which is so serious that
loss of human life is a dire probability – Titanic etc.
originated from the French phrase ‘M’aidez’ or ‘Help me’ and quickly got
Anglicised to MayDay but always calmly delivered three times, to ensure
positive reaction, as you may be about to die.
Pan” or ‘Panne’ is the French word for ‘Broken’ but, as NOT dire represents a serious
urgency situation with no immediate threat to life.
I have only ever
professionally used the MayDay Emergency term twice in my 30 year flying career
and never a Pan – yet. I now reproduce the two of my MayDay incidents from my
previously published books firstly ‘A Tale of Two Ag Pilots’2017 and secondly ‘Aerotoxic Syndrome – Aviation’s
Darkest Secret’2014, both of which
were published along with co-author Peter Lawton by Pilot Press.
Before I broadcast this next EMERGENCY MESSAGE 3 BLOG on 5 April please read this brief, ‘Public Interest’ H&S article by Private Eye and Daily Telegraph journalist Chris Booker (RIP) – note the date of 24 June 2007 :
Christopher Booker’s notebook
By Christopher Booker 12:01AM BST 24 Jun 2007
disabled by poisoned air
years back Susan Michaelis, Tristan Loraine and John Hoyte were successful
airline pilots, earning up to £100,000 a year. Last Monday, with health and
livelihood destroyed, they joined forces with some 20 other similarly disabled
pilots, to launch a campaign to alert the public to what should be seen as one
of the most alarming scandals of our time.
days later came further evidence of how the regulatory authorities, in alliance
with the airline industry itself, have stopped at nothing to cover up a health
disaster whose financial costs for the industry could run to many billions.
essence of the problem is that the air supply to the cockpits and cabins of
many modern airliners is bled off from their engines, where it becomes
contaminated with carcinogens, immunosuppressants and highly toxic
organo-phosphorus (OP) chemicals, especially a compound known as tricresyl
phosphate (TCP) used as an anti-wear additive. Both crew and passengers are
thus exposed to small amounts of OPs and a cocktail of other nasties. OPs, more
commonly used as pesticides, cumulatively attack the nervous system, causing disorders
ranging from nausea, headaches and dizziness to, eventually, serious mental and
this problem was first identified 30 years ago, following a near-fatal incident
in the US, it was kept so quiet that when hundreds of pilots in the 1980s began
to experience adverse reactions they had no idea why. One of the first to track
down the cause was Susan Michaelis, flying BA146s in Australia, when in 1997
she was permanently grounded by severe illness. Two years later, at her instigation,
an official inquiry by the Australian Senate heard enough expert evidence to
confirm that the cause of so many pilots and cabin crew suffering ill-health
was contamination of cabin air by TCP and other chemicals.
the cause was taken up in Britain by Captain Loraine, a senior member of the
British Air Line Pilots Association (BALPA), who flew Boeing 757s. But from the
industry and regulators, such as the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), they met
with a wall of denials. Although more pilots were suffering from
“aerotoxic syndrome” every year, there began a cover-up which
uncannily parallelled the methods used by government in the 1990s when the
health of thousands of farmers was destroyed by OPs in sheep dip.
in 2005, just after he had organised a BALPA conference of leading scientists
and other experts from all over the world, Captain Loraine himself became
seriously affected. Initially doctors for his airline saw no reason why he
should not continue flying, but in 2006, following further exposure to
contaminated air, he was permanently grounded by the CAA.
career of Captain Hoyte, an experienced BA146 pilot, ended the same year for
the same reason, although he was repeatedly told by doctors for his airline and
the CAA that his only problem was “stress”.
run on both pilots by the leading medical experts on OP poisoning, including
Professor Mohamed Abou-Donia, of Duke University, North Carolina, and
neuropsychologist Dr Sarah Mackenzie-Ross of University College, London, confirmed
brain cell death, cognitive problems and exposure to TCP, explaining why both
had become textbook cases of OP-induced chronic neurotoxicity.
Dr Mackenzie-Ross, who since 2003 has been carrying out an extensive study of sheep farmers and airline pilots, has estimated that, in 2004, 197,000 airline passengers in Britain alone could have been exposed to contaminated fumes. The evidence suggests that a great many people have been made ill while flying without having any idea why. One of the scientists studying this problem, Professor Chris van Netten, a Canadian epidemiologist, has analysed swabs taken from many different airliners, finding traces of TCP in more than 80 per cent of the aircraft tested.
despite the overwhelming weight of evidence, the regulators and the industry
have continued to deny that the TCP problem exists. For three years now, as
with the sheep farmers before, the British Government has relied on its
Committee on Toxicity (CoT) to conduct a seemingly interminable investigation
into “cabin air quality”, marked by a conspicuous reluctance to
address the problem of TCP.
week, Michaelis, Loraine and Hoyte joined forces at Portcullis House,
Westminster, to launch the Aerotoxic Association, backed by 110 MPs and many
peers, including those veterans of the battle to expose the scandal of OP
poisoning, the Countess of Mar and Lord (Paul) Tyler. On Wednesday, however,
the CoT produced the minutes of yet another of its meetings. As official
obfuscation, they were almost self-parodic. They referred to BALPA submitting
“data relating to organo-phosphates”, but this was the only reference
to OPs in the document. The remaining 20 pages, dealing with anything from
carbon monoxide to the need to review pilot-training procedures, showed that
the committee had no interest in whether airline crews and passengers were
being poisoned by TCP from engine oil. It is high time this particular cover-up
was blown wide open.
probably the biggest hazard, and they varied from nearly invisible telephone
wires to much more dangerous 11 kV electricity wires on poles and absolutely
lethal 275 – 400 kV national grid wires which were suspended between pylons
going up to 250 feet or more.
locations were meant to be assessed when the job was first taken on and plotted
on an appropriate large scale Ordnance Survey map, which was intended to be an
alert for the pilot. The possibility of a miss-plot of the actual position or
accidental omission led to them to be by far the most serious threat to a low
flying aircraft. The posts were the biggest clue to the presence and
orientation of the actual wires.
generally reasoned that if a huge combine harvester could fit under a wire, so
too could a small aircraft – albeit at 100 mph. The reconnaissance phase of
judging the field from above was very important to establish the exact location
of the wires – often it was best to start a spray run in an adjoining field to
manoeuvre and stay low under a wire in the main field.
itself had several defences against striking a wire.
defence was the prop travelling at around 2500 RPM and an old timer’s advice
was: ‘If you are about to hit a wire, put it on the nose and the propeller
should do the rest…’
undercarriage was also vulnerable, so along each undercarriage leg there was a
sharp edge which was supposed to slice through any cable. Additionally, there
was another sharpened edge of metal running up the front of the windscreen
which was meant to either cut or deflect a wire upwards, away from the pilot.
Then there was a strong metal cable stretching from the roof of the canopy to
the top of the rudder, this arrangement was meant to protect the fin and rudder
from being arrested suddenly by a wire.
Also film of me Aerial Fire fighting in South Australia in
1984 where I successfully proved the concept over three fire seasons of what is
now a multi-million dollar business https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wF5O91kyMMs
I was able to
test this latter feature on 19th June 1984, when I was spraying a field near
Wheaton Aston in Shropshire. As I flew out of the target field into an
adjoining field my eyes were peeled for an electricity wire which I knew was
ahead of me. But as I flew out, the lay of the land suddenly dipped away and I
realised that I was a foot or two too high and nicked the wire, with an
almighty – BANG!
As I pulled
away and up to altitude I realised that I had got away with it, but then I felt
that the rudder was completely jammed and unusable. Time to get on the ground –
quickly with unknown damage.
was flying close to RAF Chetwynd which was then a satellite helicopter training
base for RAF Shawbury. So I called Shawbury ATC with a Mayday that I was going to land on their
big grass airfield, which I did. As I surveyed the damage I was amazed to find
that the top of the rudder, to which the deflecting wire was secured, was bent
or squashed almost through 90 degrees, but fortunately it had not interfered
with the elevator – that would have meant instant death.
Soon an RAF
Gazelle helicopter landed nearby and a sympathetic RAF instructor flew me the
few miles back to Peplow Airfield and reunited me with my ground crew, who had
become concerned at my absence. They got a bit of a surprise when I arrived –
minus my Pawnee!
Fixing the aircraft
was relatively straightforward with a new rudder, and the next day I flew
nearly four hours. There were some complaints from a village which had suddenly
and mysteriously lost their electric power for a while.
me of my boss-to-be, Bill Wauchope in Australia. When one of his aerial
spraying aircraft brought down a wire, he was sent a bill from the electricity
company for the damage for around $900. Of course, Bill was annoyed with this
so he sent a bill back for the exact same amount to the electricity company for
the damage sustained to his aircraft by the wire. Touché!
MayDay 2. Red Alert.
important to catch up from where my narrative last left me, flying BAe 146
freight aircraft. At the outset of my airline career in 1989, my ambition had
been to graduate from a medium-sized aircraft like the BAe 146 to something
larger, for example a Boeing 757, and fly on longer routes. That is a typical
career progression for a pilot. In the late 1990s I was still only in my
mid-40s, and this would have been the normal next step. But I was worried that
my ‘mystery illness’ meant I would have serious difficulty learning to fly a
new aircraft type. (Film of me speaking with difficulty in 2001: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gw7z6Mytq1M
always a mass of new data, different control systems and so on to master when
you start to fly a different type. I knew the BAe 146 so well that I had no
problem flying it even in my poor condition, and so I decided the best idea
would be to stay with the BAe 146, but to switch from the night flights, which
I had thought were causing my illness, to daytime flying. There were still a few short-haul UK carriers
operating the BAe 146, and in 1998 I applied to Jersey European Airways – later
to become the budget airline Flybe – and got a ‘direct entry’ as an experienced
captain. For the next seven years I flew short-haul passenger flights, between
UK airports (particularly Birmingham, Belfast and the Channel Isles) and
destinations all over Europe.
I was flying
on New Year’s Eve 2002 when there was a serious incident on board. For the
first time in my career, the emergency red call light from the cabin crew lit
up in front of me. We had just begun a ‘round-the-islands’ trip – Birmingham–
Jersey–Guernsey–Birmingham – and were still climbing on the initial
Birmingham–Jersey leg when my number one, Emma, told me on the intercom.
‘There’s a fire in the rear toilet.’ Under the circumstances she was admirably
cool; she knew as well as I did that an uncontrolled fire in an aircraft
creates an immensely dangerous situation.
with established procedures to follow certainly helped me and my first officer
Steve ‘Bravo’ to stay calm and deal with the emergency. Steve was the handling
pilot for the flight, so we elected that he would continue to fly the aircraft
during the descent and landing. This is a good division of labour in an
emergency; the first officer flies the aircraft, while the captain analyses the
situation, communicates with Air Traffic Control (ATC) and the passengers and
crew, and generally manages events. I immediately radioed a Mayday call to London and
announced to the passengers that we had to make an immediate return to
Birmingham. London ATC were excellent.
us quickly down to 2,500 feet and cleared us for landing, before handing us
back to Birmingham, where the controllers already knew about our serious
problem. We opted for a fast ‘tear drop’ approach with a slight tail wind
bringing us back onto the runway we had just departed from. Meanwhile, Emma
helped the other cabin crew gather fire extinguishers and check the rear panels
for heat, seeking the source of the blaze. This wasn’t easy; there was plenty
of smoke in the toilets, but it didn’t seem to be the seat of the fire.
mysteriously, the smoke dissipated as we began the descent. Because the fire
didn’t seem to be getting worse, we decided we need not order the passengers to
do a full emergency evacuation down the chutes when we reached the ground. It
is not easy to use the chutes, and it can cause serious injuries to passengers,
so it is good practice to do so only when essential. We were met by a full
turnout of fire engines following us down the runway, and once the passengers
had disembarked the fire crew came on board.
They didn’t find a fire, and in retrospect it was clear that there had
not been one. This had just been a particularly bad oil ‘fume event’.
eventual version of events was that the Number 3 engine bleed air valve was
brand new and that the engineers had failed to remove the protective oil that
the valve is covered in before fitting it. This oil then had apparently burned
off into the cabin, so it was a small incident that would by its nature have
been short-lived. I found this explanation hard to accept. There had been so
much visible smoke: I thought the sheer amount of fumes indicated a more major
oil leak. And there were rumours floating around the company at about this time
about a change in the type of oil to be used in the future, because engineering
had found something unsafe. I learned
much later that the company’s explanation was not in fact true. The cause of
the fumes had been neat engine oil contaminating the bleed air from Number 3 engine.
In early 2003, however, we were too exhausted, and busy with the schedule, to
have the time or the energy to pursue the matter.
Pan Day 3. 5 April 2020.
Pan this is John Hoyte of Aerotoxic Association Ltd. company which has served
the public interest since 2007 has run out of money & about to crash
financially solely due to the 13 year long Aerotoxic BBC Cover-up (ABC) which
is caused by the word of ALL professional aircrew not being believed…Ironically
my health is fine, but my company’s work is sick through lack of public
Urgent Public FINANCIAL Help requested…
FREE ‘evidence’ FACT & FICTION Aerotoxic films:
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