Blog 3 5 March 2022 – Open Communication for the public authorities

Blog 3 5 March 2022 – Open Communication for the public authorities

4 March 2022

Open communication

To whom it may concern,

Exactly forty years after I first relocated from Norfolk to Shropshire and now I am preparing to return to live and work in Shropshire for a third and final time on Saturday 5 March 2022. I had a partially successful trial run 12 months ago.

Since the spring of 1990, my life has been defined by being made invisibly ill from flying the BAe 146 jet, like countless other aircrew and passengers around the world whose health has been adversely affected by a known, fundamental design flaw of most jet aircraft of continuing to use contaminated (mostly with carbon monoxide) ‘bleed air’ to ventilate the cabin with toxic air sensors which are deliberately not fitted.

On 10 January 2022 I signed a formally witnessed Statement, which can be found on along with other global dated evidence for any public court to consider. As 260 overdue Unite the Union Toxic Cabin Air legal cases are about to be judged in London, imminently – which most would agree is of public interest.

I now have the choice of making my return to Shropshire fully public and share my story to date or go as quietly as possible back to Shropshire to pursue my general flying interests, which includes resolving the cabin air problem with known solutions and responsible public authorities including the Police, CAA and BBC.

But my future actions will be based on how the UK government deals with this situation, as to date – they have not responded appropriately. Aerotoxicity has become defined by money – nothing to do with science nor medicine.

Many people have become aware over the years of my involvement with this systematically covered-up danger of flying from toxic cabin air exposure, which has been well known about and documented since 1955 with a brief BBC Panorama report of 2008 to the UK public.

It is reasoned that it may not now be in the public interest to know the full extent of this covered-up cause of mass public poisoning, which can affect anyone who flies because the world has suddenly become a very unstable state, but public health is always the priority and must now be addressed.

However, I do have a public duty to Her Majesty the Queen to share my expert knowledge, experience and evidence with others to eventually resolve this known H&S issue for future generations and that is what I will do in Shropshire – either with full publicity of my story or more behind the scenes, with outside help and on agreed terms.

John Hoyte

Former BAe 146 Training Captain
Aerotoxic Solutions Consultancy Ltd.

Blog 2 – 3 March 2022 More about Aerotoxic Solutions Consultancy (ASC) Ltd. & Shropshire, UK.

Blog 2 – 3 March 2022 More about Aerotoxic Solutions Consultancy (ASC) Ltd. & Shropshire, UK.

As a career professional pilot, I first became aware of Aerotoxic Syndrome (AS) in early 2006 soon after I had had to retire prematurely at the age of 49 from being an airline pilot for 16 years.

I had experienced a variety of severe neurological symptoms for 15 of those years and I was disturbed to find out that the illness had already been well known about as a US Doctor, a French forensic scientist and an Australian toxicologist had first published their peer reviewed paper on 20 October 1999 and many other scientific papers have been published since, as the public’s health is traded for profit by certain people.

Because AS involves huge amounts of money, the public illness has been covered up by successive governments around the world as they put the health and wellbeing of industry ahead of public health.

I have run Aerotoxic Association Ltd (not for profit) and invested around £250K since 2007 but I realised in recent times that I had become very familiar with most of the known and available lucrative solutions. That’s why I founded the company in 2021 and now it’s overdue to focus on helping the public with known solutions whilst others continue to argue over the illness’s existence. We never argue over whether the public illness exists or not, just concentrate on the known solutions.

ASC is for profit, as we need key people who are used to dealing with money, but the overwhelming requirement must always be that anyone involved must always put public health first, as is frequently claimed by governments.

The known solutions are Medical, Technical, Occupational health, ‘Further Research’ and Legal – but the common theme throughout is aviation – so a keen interest for those who have a love of flying would be a definite advantage, as I wish to return to flying in the future, mostly.

One of the challenges is that few people – even in flying are aware of this covered up public disease, but this will soon change, as there are 260 UK Unite the Union public court cases waiting to be heard from March 2022 onwards – these legal cases have built up steadily over the past 5 years and have been delayed by Covid 19 but are now waiting to be judged.

Few doubt the outcome of eventual formal global disease recognition with other developed countries in similar situations and isolated public court wins which began in the High Court of Australia with Turner v’s East West Airlines on 3 September 2010 after a ‘fume event’ 18 years earlier.

But we know from published parliamentary evidence and a 2008 BBC Panorama  that large (40) groups of passengers (including young children) on a single flight can also be affected and there are around 1,000,000 aircrew and frequent flyers with AS in Europe alone – an attractive business proposition therefore – for the right sort of people to help those who have been injured and their journey to enlightenment and recovery.

Shropshire has been a special county for me since the 1980’s when I was an aerial spraying pilot. Salop is a friendly, ‘Can Do’ place where the people care for one another and the right business mix exists for a Darwin style of new company where money is a by-product, not the aim.

It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the one that is most adaptable to change”.

Any new business is as good as the people in it and whilst I am mostly qualified to fly aeroplanes which includes forward thinking, tough decision making and creativity – I need others on board who relish change, know clever stuff and have the vision of helping others, always knowing that anything is possible.

John Hoyte
3 March 2022

Blog 1:   2 March 2022  – Return to living in Shropshire after 40 years 1982 – 2022.

Blog 1: 2 March 2022 – Return to living in Shropshire after 40 years 1982 – 2022.

My flying logbook tells me that at 1530 on 22 February 1982 I landed for the first time at Condover airfield, south of Shrewsbury in Shropshire after a 90 minute flight from Gloucestershire in very poor visibility.

I can still recall the thrill of arriving in a new county where I would spend five happy years living and flying. I had been aerial crop spraying for a couple of years in Norfolk and wanted to ‘do my own thing’ and life all seemed too good to be true.

But we only had land line phones, the post and VHF radios in those relatively innocent and simple pre internet days.

I would be working with a great Shropshire friend John Fergusson who would operate the Bedford loading lorry and whose parents still farmed near Telford, so local and invaluable help, who already knew the county very well. We also had a Norfolk marker Ian – who rushed around in a Renault van marking the fields and generally preparing the work all over Shropshire, Herefordshire, Staffordshire and Wales.

We all lived together in a large rented house in Bayston Hill, close to Condover and having been brought up and schooled in East Anglia for the first years of my life – I was always keen ‘to go over the horizon’ and find new challenges. It has always been notoriously difficult for anyone to get a steady job in aviation, close to where one lives.

East Anglia is notoriously flat and has therefore always has been relatively easy to fly from as there are no hills or mountains to deal with. I was looking forward to the new challenges of flying in Shropshire which I found to be utterly beautiful and magical, as the locals were very warm and welcoming, which I was told was due to the fact that their farmers went to weekly livestock markets and enjoyed banter and fun.

My Father had previously moved to live and work near Oswestry – so apart from having close family there I soon made lifelong friends amongst the locals over the next 5 happy years.

In the winter of 1982, I needed to keep working so I went out to Kenya and flew there at 10,000’ above mean sea level, spraying barley for The Kenya Brewery, but I also nearly killed myself several times as flying at high altitude required new skills but it was a great experience living with the Maasai for three months.

I would then over winter in safer South Australia where I continued aerial spraying and first developed aerial fire fighting over four years.

By 1987, I had got married to a Norfolk girl who was living in Shropshire and were becoming aware that aerial spraying was going out of fashion as it was being replaced by low pressure, wide boom ground sprayers, so we decided to change my aviation career as anyone has to do in life – by flying larger, supposedly safer aircraft and we moved to Warwickshire to be nearer to the main airfields of Coventry, Birmingham, Luton and Heathrow.

Ironically, I nearly lost my life on my last ferry flight back to Old Buckenham, Norfolk on 17 September 1987, my mother’s birthday with added pressure to return as I got lost in heavy rain and low cloud in the Midlands but got back to Norfolk, eventually.

But leaving Shropshire to fly larger aircraft would prove to be a serious mistake for me and countless others – as I now know that jet aircraft are not safer.

I now chose to return to both live and fly in Shropshire and take up new careers – exactly 40 years on.

John Hoyte
2 March 2022

A Group Memorandum John M. Lind CPCU ARM 26 Janauary 2022


To: Whom it may concern  

From: John M. Lind CPCU ARM  

Date: 26 January 2022  

Subject: Contaminated air in airliner cabins, A summary but comprehensive presentation  

Ladies / Gentlemen:  

Call it what we may, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Sensors, Section 326(d) in context with  contaminated cabin air is made necessary by the failure of the RITE/ACER/COE congressionally mandated  program. RITE ACER offered very little knowledge useful to understanding this most illusive occupational  and public health hazard. Illusive, but fundamentally very simply understood, it continues to be a case of  industry cover-up. If anyone would doubt this statement, ask:  

(1) Who is responsible to the people to know and understand the hazards arising from public service  operations?  

(2) What is their responsibility for the cost of accidents and incidents incurred by employees and  passengers during commercial operations?  

(3) Are they fulfilling their obligation?  

(4) The FAA does not investigate fume incidents even though some “incidents” have been fatal. Why  not?  

(5) Why after 40 years has the airline industry failed to solve the contaminated cabin air problem?  Cover up? The questions answer themselves!  

 During the active ACER program, 2004 to 2014, air carrier executives did their collective best to control  opportunity and dialog around this federal mandate. They controlled access to aircraft, chose the aircraft  that could be evaluated, denied investigation on revenue flights, delayed supporting activities, and  somehow, budgeted funding didn’t arrive when and where it was needed. Eventually, in pure pork barrel  fashion, politicians usurped funds for their own pet projects at home.  

How will the industry respond now to the requirements demanded by Section 326(d)?  Truth . . . . as it is intended to apply to this discussion is the truth as I have come to see it.  

  1. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 – S-2493, 95th Congress.  

You may have heard this before so I’ll be brief – Into the 1970s, government lawmakers grew more  and more intolerant of high airfares that priced most of society out of air travel. The excesses of the  Civil Aeronautics Board, regulator of all things necessary to air operations, had outlived its industry protective usefulness. Carelessly, the U.S. Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. (1) 

In doing so it forced upon airline managers an 18th century, poorly understood (or deliberately  misrepresented), impractical theory of economics. (2) The expected aggressive competition began and  continued for decades. Fares fell to operationally unsustainable levels leading to excessive cost cutting.  Airline economics turned upside down as expenses fell to meet revenue. Employees were denied  statutory workers compensation; (3) new aircraft and engine maintenance protocols became assurances  that high costs of engine overhauls and bearing seal replacement could safely be avoided.(4)  

Executives now emphasize engine and APU degradation and remaining useful life (RUL). Thus, in  some cases, old, run out engines and APUs become throw away items. Even problem aircraft are  thrown away, reference B-767 N251AY, which is rumored to have burned at the gate in another land. 


  1. The Air Travel Experience – systemic deterioration in air transportation services.  Fifteen to twenty years of industry attrition and decay followed S-2493. Bankruptcies, mergers,  acquisitions, hostile takeovers drove the industry to the brink of disaster. Passenger load factors  increased and revenue fell, customer services were re-invented from complimentary into profit centers.  Uncertainties (5) such as fuel prices, weather, maintenance imperatives, security, changing demand, and  operating adjustments had to be endured under liquidity crises where the generous revenue structure  under CAB rule once carried these burdens effortlessly.  

With demand for seats ever climbing and surviving fleets expanding, the need to push aircraft  utilization to new limits dominated the day. Creeping equipment deterioration occurred. Maintenance  shortcuts ended or delayed necessary repairs. Aircraft with aging engines and APUs continued in  revenue service. Gradually over the period from 1985 to the present, incidents of cabin air  contamination grew. Auxiliary power units in tail cones high off the tarmac required maintenance  platforms for access. They were often overlooked. Some of the worst cases of crew and passenger  disability are attributed to the APU. Engine compressor bearing seals, a recognized source of engine oil  “consumption”, which were regularly replaced before deregulation, have long exceeded their useful  lives.  

The most dangerous consequence of this systemic deterioration was increased incidents of smoke  and fumes causing increased numbers of aircrew and passenger illnesses. Executives and regulators  have ignored their safety and health responsibilities; these dangers remain with us today.  

Major Unintended Consequences:  

Deregulation wasn’t a mistake; some say necessary. It was a poorly conducted process of  inducement to bring more business into the air transportation industry. Instead of planning a  gradual weaning-off from micro-regulations, air carriers were abandoned to “slug each other  senseless” for survival. (6) 

 Deregulation rendered the airline industry unaccountable to all authority, state, Federal, and  public opinion, except the FAA. Grossly, underfunded and poorly guided, the FAA is incapable  of exercising its Congress-delegated authority.  

 Cost cutting to extremes has created a system of constant whack-a-mole to try to keep ahead  of recurring uncertainties and the costs thereof.  

 Prevention in equipment maintenance and employee safety is now but a recollection from the  past among the few who might remember.  

 On-the-job injuries that had been a predictable routine in the airline industry, today are  grossed up by the unanticipated aerotoxic syndrome casualties. Statistics were comprehensive  and accurate! Once upon a time the OJI’s were carefully recorded, marshaled for claimant  indemnification, combed for loss control frequency and severity, shared with NCCI for rate  making, and the National Safety Council for industrial ranking. All of that was my responsibility.  Today most or all of it has been trashed by the airline industry.  

 Carrier executives no longer comply with state workers compensation laws because they know  the historical frequency and severity of accidents brought financial losses unserviceable in the  mandated, low airfare, oversight-poor environment that is by definition, deregulation in a free  marketplace.  

III. Question. Is the contaminated cabin air issue the result of a faulty product?  I once thought the engine bleed air system was a faulty product, a product design defect. As a  former aircraft products liability insurance underwriter (as well as workers comp), and having now had  time to study the aerotoxic situation thoroughly, I am not so sure.  

Powerplant designers, engineers, and manufacturers at the beginning of the jet age were designing  for a revolutionary world of never before seen fast and high-flying aircraft. Previously, passenger  aircraft would struggle to fly over mountain ranges at the lowest levels of the troposphere. Later piston powered aircraft like the Boeing Stratocruiser and the Lockheed Constellation needed engine-driven  superchargers to maintain sufficient combustion air for high altitude operation. These superchargers  also offered enough excess compressed air for the cabins of these aircraft. Jet engines do not use  superchargers. For jet travel then, designers would need a new design for routine flight where  pressurized air would always be essential for air traveler comfort and survival.  

Engine designers and engineers, however, were well aware of the possibility that engine oil could  bypass oil seals at the engine bearing sumps. They soon decided that using engine bleed air as their  basic resource for cabin pressurization and life sustaining oxygen was too much of a worry to  contemplate.(7) Boeing produced its first production jet-liner, the 707, using clean outside air. Their  design used bleed air to drive a turbo compressor (similar in principle to the supercharger) to compress  and condition air for the aircraft interior. McDonald Douglas with the DC-8 and Convair, the 880, would  follow with similar basic designs.  

These aircraft needed four engines to assure thrust sufficient to sustain adequate performance in  this new environment. Even so, they were underpowered. Just why designers, engineers, and  manufacturers so soon abandoned the original clean air philosophy is not specifically explained in the  literature. We must surmise:  

  1. a) Air inlets feeding fresh air to turbocompressors created aerodynamic drag;  
  2. b) Turbo-compressors added weight, hence drag.  
  3. c) Turbo-compressors are an additional maintenance and cost burden.  
  4. d) Rapidly evolving state-of-the-art designs created low and high bypass turbofan engines that  produced an excess of thrust and compressed air.  
  5. e) Inflation required financial reconsideration of cost benefits of equipment and wages.  f) The Boeing 787 style electric generator-driven bleed free compressor system creates power loss at  the gearbox-driven generators in addition to costs mentioned above.  
  6. g) Both engines on the Boeing 787 have three generators – two for primary electrical demand and  redundancy. The third is dedicated to driving the turbocompressor. If a B-787 engine should be lost  during high altitude climb and cruise, one engine could not alone carry the additional demand for  pressurization. The aircraft would be forced to descend.  
  7. h) Weight of the entire bleed air system and its components is removed by this system, the VSFG –  variable frequency starter generator. (8)

These and any other possible burdens that increase flight duration, burn fuel, add maintenance, or  in any way force deviations from regular operations so as to increase operating costs will be financially  unacceptable to airline executives.  

We note, therefore, that airline management is cost-driven – first, last, and always. They must  operate on this basis. Manufacturers are challenged to meet this airline-imposed financial barrier and  compete in the marketplace accordingly. Isn’t it easy to see that research, development, and  manufacturing of the airline aircraft and powerplant product have now evolved to the point of near  perfection? Can it be that the small percentage of imperfection, partly represented by leaky bearing  seals, might be a current state-of-the-art limitation rather than a faulty design or manufacture?  

  1. Our history with sensors  

Advocates for aerotoxic casualties have asked engine manufacturers to repair or replace turbofan  engine bearing seals. The effort to do so leads to the practical decision that once engine disassembly is  needed to replace the seals, a complete engine overhaul will become beneficial. The cost at this point,  as high as $3,000,000, is prohibitive to the overhauler’s and manufacturer’s customer.  

Advocates have also asked aircraft manufacturers to install air sensors in the cabin or oil leak  sensors in engines and ducting. One specific response from an engine manufacturer states, “We will not  put anything on an aircraft that is not ordered by the customer”.  

Today constant monitoring of aircraft in operation around the world provides detailed, sensor-recorded degradation data on turbofan engines. (9) Engines can operate for 10 to 20 years or more  without major maintenance. Air carrier executives now depend upon actual data showing low engine  degradation rates and related useful life (RUL) of engines to permit on-wing continuous operations for  up to a not unusual 50,000 hours. (10)  


With all of the detailed engine monitoring, there are no sensors installed for the purpose of  monitoring cabin air contaminants, not in the air, nor in the engines or ECS ducting. Installing such  sensors to advise pilots when they need to make emergency landings and also advise of necessary  maintenance would erase the cost saving benefits of the entire preventive maintenance protocol. No  matter that aircraft become non-airworthy. No matter that flight attendants become permanently  disabled from carbon monoxide poisoning; pilots and passengers too. No matter that this scenario has  influenced non-compliance with state workers compensation laws. No matter that the airline industry,  writ large, has become a swamp of financial fraud perpetrated for employer financial benefit at the  expense of the innocent flight attendant, pilot, and unsuspecting passenger.  

Forced into the deregulation corner . . .  

This is the air transportation norm of operations today.  

We anticipate sensor data confirming contamination in airliner cabins. Will the 117th Congress  begin a process that will offset the folly of the 95th Congress? Will the results of compliance with  Section 326(d) influence seal replacement? Will new designs result that will remove or mitigate the  toxic fumes from airliner cabins? As air carriers recover from the scourge of a crippling pandemic will  they have mood or desire to be rid of toxic cabin air? Or will they retreat into their tortoise shells of  unaccountability?  

Ill, injured, and disabled crewmembers and their advocates place themselves in positions to see  that the best interests in human health and flying safety are practiced. After four decades of the  international conspiracy of silence about contaminated cabin air, the traveling public deserves no less.  


(1) (a) S.2493, The Act – . . . . to encourage, develop, and attain an air transportation system which relies on competitive market  forces to determine quality, variety, and price of air services . . . .  

(b) CAB Closing – “Now they are on their own. Free markets and private industry do a better job than the Federal  Government.”  

(2)  (3) Reports from crewmember testimony, the media, medical records. Cases of wrongfully denied workers compensation.  Undeniable cases of fraud made possible by contracts between employer and claims service companies that in a regulated  environment would be prosecuted as illegal purposes. To be assembled when needed to support purposeful action.  (4) Preventive Maintenance – 

(5) Uncertainty-in-Airline-Revenue-Management.pdf  

(6) Hard Landing, Thomas Petzinger, Jr. Pg. 86 – “a naïve public establishment with the promise of low airfares if only Washington  would force the airlines to compete. The airlines . . . . were dragged kicking and screaming into the coliseum, where, like clumsy  gladiators, they aimlessly slugged each other senseless. Only when it was too late did Congress grasp its folly.” (7) (a) 1953-0560.pdf, Comet Engineering, Air conditioning, 4th paragraph. Attached.  

(b)  (c)  

(8) Aircraft Powerplants, Wild & Kroes, 8th Edition, Page 410.  

(9) (a)   (b)  (c)  


Statement of Truth 10 January 2022

Statement of Truth 10 January 2022

To whom it may concern. 

It has been long accepted and admitted that compressed air from jet engines has been  contaminated with engine oil which contains many harmful chemicals including VOC’s  and Organophosphate substances which are universally accepted to be harmful to  health with well-known symptoms. 

The UK Government has been aware and discussing the problem for a number of years  whilst the vast majority of the public and medical profession remain completely  unaware of scale and extent of the problem.  

As a result of 27 pilots’ blood and fat being tested in March – May of 2006 with  associated memory and cognitive function tests carried out at the same time by UCL  (University College London) it has revealed shocking and incontrovertible evidence that  there is a serious health hazard for anybody who flies in these aeroplanes; especially the  crews and is therefore a serious flight safety issue. The report will be available from  May 22nd 2006, but may be restricted in its distribution for obvious reasons. 

Other people that have also been at risk are the entire Royal family and senior members  of the Government who have flown on the BAe 146 for the last twenty years and cannot have escaped the same contamination. 

The BAe 146 and Boeing 757 are well known for being the worst offenders of  commercial airliners, possibly due to sharing a similar make of APU or Auxiliary Power  Unit and its use on the ground. 

There have been many incidents and fatal accidents attributed to ‘fatigue’ and ‘pilot  error’ on the BAe 146 and B. 757 over the years but never any suggestion that  contaminated air is fundamentally to blame. 

I wish to make it clear that due to intense covering up of the phenomenon over the past  ten years or more it is now my duty to point out that any accident in the future should  be regarded as probably being caused by this effect and for any suggestion that it is not  a factor to be subject of a criminal enquiry and manslaughter charges for those people  denying the link. 

Statement by: 

John Grahame Hoyte 

22nd May 2006. 

………………………………………………………………………………………………… Past: 

My previous Statement was written on 22 May 2006 and is now updated as a result of new  evidence. 

At the time, I was sure that I had discovered a cause of mass public ill health, with little to do  with medicine, science and all to do with money – public health is claimed as paramount.

On 18 June 2007, I launched the Aerotoxic Association Ltd. at the  Houses of Parliament, London having founded the association as a Limited Company ‘The  Charity’ on 19 March 2007. association-ltd-the-charity/ 

Present at the launch were Captain Tristan Loraine, Dr Susan Michaelis, Captain Julian  Soddy (formerly of BALPA – British Airline Pilot Association) and other aircrew, plus  Samantha Sabatino – a passenger.  

LHS John Hoyte, Susan Michaelis with paper, Tristan Loraine with tin, Julian Soddy RHS. 

The launch was covered by The Daily Telegraph 24 June 2007: Pilots disabled by poisoned  air: Telegraph-1.pdf 

The term Aerotoxic Syndrome was first published on 20 October 1999 by US Flight  surgeon Dr Harry Hoffman, forensic scientist Dr Jean Christophe Balouet of France and toxicologist Professor Chris Winder of Australia as a result of their research throughout the  1990’s. 

I was unaware of the term in my previous Statement, as Capt. Loraine first introduced it to  me in June 2006. The chronology of this ‘story’ is essential throughout: Who knew which evidence and when. 

More recently, the UK government and aviation lawyers have referred to the public disease  as ‘Aerotoxic Poisoning’ 30th-june-2019.pdf or ‘Aerotoxicity’ or ‘Aero Toxic’. 

WHO published an updated report in 2017: “AEROTOXIC SYNDROME: A NEW  OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE?”. 

Since 2006, I have met and been contacted by countless other members of the public from  around the world who have had their health adversely affected by flying in ‘Bleed air’ jets that comprise all jets, with the sole 

exception of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner, which does not use bleed air architecture for cabin  air.  

In this Statement, as a cross section of survivors, I cite three different examples of evidence  over the past 16 years of 1) A former RAF test Pilot 2) A group (40) of Passengers and  3) A former Cabin Crew – flying in different countries and in different types of jet aircraft. 

  1. Captain Julian Soddy, a former RAF and BAe 146 pilot and campaigner who has  appeared in many documentaries since 2004 including a BBC Panorama ‘Something  in the air’ shown on 21 April 2008. His evidence was in the House of Lords 2007  Science & Technology Report. Captain Soddy of Norfolk, UK chaired the BALPA (British Airline Pilot Association) Cabin Air Quality London conference of 20/21  April 2005: rom/BALPA-CAPC-London-2005_WINDER.pdf & 

  1. A group of 40 unrelated passengers (including young children) of Flight XLA 120 on  1 February 2007 led by Samantha Sabatino flying from London Gatwick, UK to  Sanford International, Florida, US also gave evidence to the House of Lords in 2007, appeared in a 2007 documentary ‘Welcome Aboard Toxic Airlines’, BBC Panorama of  2008, ‘Toxic Flyer’ 60 Minutes ABC Australia in 2013 & Stewarts Law of London  represented them until 2012. 

Aerotoxic Poisoning 

3 May 2010 

The Stewarts Law Attorney Group represents 20 British passengers who were  seriously injured by aircraft toxic fumes exposure on 1 February 2007. The incident  occurred when they were flying onboard an XL Airways Boeing 767 from London  Gatwick to Sanford International, Florida. 

The dangerous toxins were released into the cabin through the bleed air system  which (as on most airliners) draws high-pressure air from the core of the engines to  pressurise the aircraft with breathable air. It has long been known that this design  can result in the cabin air becoming contaminated with toxic oil vapour when the  engine oil seals leak. 

Passengers detected the toxic air as they began to notice an odd smell similar to  ‘smelly socks’. The cabin seemed more ‘stuffy’ and ‘hot’ than any previous flight  they had been on, and the air severely irritated their eyes, nose and throat. The  

passengers quickly became ill, suffering respiratory issues, severe headaches,  vomiting, bowel problems, skin blistering and extreme fatigue. The toxic air also  caused them to experience long term / chronic effects such as respiratory problems,  memory loss, sleep disturbances, chronic fatigue, mood swings, cognitive  difficulties, infections, and joint/limb pains. 

To put pressure on the US manufacturers to deal with these known cabin air  problems and to obtain fair compensation for the passengers, on 29 January 2009  specialist litigation firm Stewart’s Law filed the case in Illinois, the state where  Boeing has its Headquarters. In addition to ‘Boeing’, the lawsuit was filed against 

‘Hamilton Sundstrand’ (manufacturers of air systems components), ‘United  Technologies’ (manufacturers of the Pratt & Whitney engines) and the owners of  the aircraft – ‘AAR Parts Trading Inc’. 

This case is an outright US product liability case against US defendants. However,  the defendants were intent on having the case sent back to the UK courts (which are  much more expensive for claimants and award much lower compensation). They  filed a forum non-conveniens motion, arguing that the UK is the most convenient  place for the litigation. 

After the prolonged legal battle, on 3 May 2010 Judge Quinn decided in favour of  the passengers and dismissed the defendants’ forum non-conveniens motion.  Stewart’s Law has achieved a great victory for the passengers. Securing US  jurisdiction along with the prospect of a high profile jury trial is a wake up call for  US manufacturers – unless they take measures to improve the quality of cabin air  now, they will face the credible prospect of expensive and public US litigation for  future incidents where there is an identifiable toxic fumes leak that causes injury. 

A large group of unrelated passengers (which may include doctors,scientists and politicians etc) becoming acutely and chronically sick on the same flight is crucial to demonstrate that  anyone can be made sick on any flight as they ‘pay to fly’ and that both aircrew and  passengers are genuinely ill and do not have the so-called ‘Nocebo effect’ or ‘hyperventilation’ fly/Guidance-for-health-professionals/Aircraft-fume-events/ as often claimed by some  ‘doctors’:  

***Both Captain Soddy and the XLA 120 passenger evidence may all be viewed at the  following: 

120.html?fbclid=IwAR3azXQTD2aes1OthhXQr1mXbBG8lJ2yaduzmupegmhke1WV5X7j9 yHDBH4 

  1. Evelyn van den Heuvel – formerly a cabin crew of KLM and The Netherlands who  began flying aged 23 in 2006 – flew for only three years and is now permanently  injured and harmed for life and she finally won her public court case in June 2021.  “I want aerotoxic syndrome to become a recognized disease. I wasn’t aware of it. Now I’m a wreck”. Another legal precedent for countless others: cabine-ik-ben-een-wrak~af6e3cef/ & 

After understanding the cause of mass public ill health in early 2006, I attended the first  meeting of the Global Cabin Air Quality Executive (GCAQE) on the 5 October 2006.  

I have attended each of 15 annual conferences of GCAQE since including the online  conference 15-18 March 2021. 

A key expert witness over the past 20 years has been Dr Sarah Mackenzie Ross of University  College London (UCL) who attended the BALPA conference of 2005, attended the first  GCAQE meeting of 2006 and continues to work on and research this public health issue.

During the last half of 2021, I have hosted regular weekly ‘A’ Team Friday meetings on  Zoom which includes former US aviation insurance Expert with an aerotoxic injured flight  attendant daughter; a former General Practitioner; a Professor – expert in sensor technology and aerotoxic syndrome; an expert witness aviation Engineer; a former Sub Postmaster who  are all unaffected by aerotoxic syndrome and several past and present aircrew. 

We have, as an expert team, published in mid 2021 a novel engineering solution in a  recognized journal for avoiding contaminated air in the future. 

BBC – coverage of CAQ (Cabin Air Quality) over the past 17 years has been disappointing  given that the illness can affect anyone who flies as evidenced by the BBC Panorama  coverage of a large passenger group in 2008 and is usually only broadcast on regional  programmes or the World Service in the small hours of the morning.  

In 2009, I contacted the BBC to cover new published research and a Radio 4 Today  programme was broadcast on 24 September 2009. Detailed evidence may be seen in my  personal diaries (which I kept from 17 October 2006 to 23 July 2013) of other members of  the public who contacted me following the broadcast and I am still in touch with today. 

In 2015, I was interviewed live by the BBC in Norwich about the legal case of Richard  Westgate, a former BA pilot, who had first contacted the Aerotoxic Association on 16 March  2012 and died on 12 December 2012. On the way to the studio, I was told by the BBC that I  could appear but must not mention either the airlines I had flown for, TNT & Flybe, or the  words ‘Cover-up’. 

It has been frustrating recently that the BBC have not kept the public informed about public  court wins and published science with the absence of any open public debate which is now  blocking formal medical recognition and the known/available solutions from introduction. 

The latest BBC coverage was on 25 February 2020 51633897 and it is known that the 260 UK aircrew legal cases will finally begin from March  2022, and the British public and BBC licence fee payers are in for a shock. 

After years of gathering evidence, 10 lead cases against four UK airlines are due at the  Royal Courts of Justice this year. Unite, the union behind the action, says it wants the public  to know about the aviation industry’s biggest secret. “An extraordinary amount of powerful  evidence has been gathered,” says General Secretary Howard Beckett. “The simple reality for us is that our members are at risk from low-level exposure, and it is a  simple reality that frequent fliers will also be at risk as a result,” he told me.” 

Over the past two years particularly, new evidence has been sent to the BBC, but the public appear to being kept in the dark. Aerotoxic appears to be a taboo and banned word. 

Oxford Neuroscience  

As a result of a chance meeting in May 2021 with a senior research Doctor of Oxford  University Neuroscience it was hoped that their interest  in ‘further research’ work might take place, but this was before a key peer reviewed paper  was published, the Dutch public court win and ACES of late 2021 – so no further interest  resulted.

Dr David Megson 

Just before the premature death of Dr Jean Christophe Balouet on 31 March 2021, he put me  in touch with Dr David Megson of Manchester University who explained that a new ‘peer  reviewed’ scientific paper would be published later in 2021. 

This paper Occupational risk of organophosphates and other chemical and radiative  exposure in the aircraft cabin: A systematic review” was finally published in July 2021: 

It was particularly frustrating that this key peer reviewed published paper was not shared with  the public by the BBC and other media with the public as of public interest, however the  paper has since been sent to and acknowledged by the Business Manager to the Chair and  Chief Executive of the UK Civil Aviation Authority on 17 December 2021. 


Recent key evidence from the US includes: The Aerotoxic Association was contacted by  Attorney John Martin of KJC Law in Boston in early October 2020 and based on my help now advertises to represent injured parties (aircrew or passengers). 

& Blog aerotoxic-syndrome-explained/ 

There are around 10 other US law companies advertising for new clients – Google ‘Toxic  Cabin Air’: 

In July 2020, a key legal case of Captain Andrew Myers was won in the US: https://48b4ed48-471d-4786-b5ed 

US Attorney’s piece for the Myer’s case: https://48b4ed48-471d-4786-b5ed 

The LA Times reported on 17 December 2020 about Toxic Cabin Air ‘We are slowly being  poisoned’. This article focused on the reasoning behind the absence of toxic air sensors: “Senior Boeing engineers worried that data from sensors would prove damaging in  lawsuits by sick passengers and crew members”. 

In 2021, Teledyne of the US announced the first Toxic Air Sensor – Aircraft Cabin  Environment Sensor (ACES) which has been approved for the Boeing 737 and Airbus A320  but is able to be used in any bleed air jet aircraft.

In Teledyne’s White Paper: 

Areas of Controversy: 

Whether deserved or not, bleed air is often the primary target in the cabin air quality  debate, even though typically electric fans and many other cabin items contribute a far  greater number of reported SFO events. One reason is bleed air’s possible role as a conduit  to bringing low levels of engine oil or hydraulic fluid into the cabin, which might be  harmful for people exposed over long periods of time. Suspicion has fallen on engine load bearing seals (see Figure 11) as one source of oil, and compounds such as tricresyl  phosphate, or TCP, in the oil as perhaps responsible for causing harm. Aerotoxic  Syndrome has been proposed as a name for the symptoms seen in some flight crew, but  there remains debate about whether or not it exists.  

It would appear that further open public debate is required to judge whether Aerotoxic  Syndrome does actually exist. 

In 2014, respected aviation journalist David Learmount wrote the following Foreword for my  ‘Pilot Press’ published book Aerotoxic Syndrome – Aviation’s Darkest Secret’ 

Aerotoxic syndrome exists. But so does systematic denial by the aviation industry and its  government backers. As an aviation journalist for 35 years at the time of writing this  Foreword, for a long time I believed the industry when it told me, hand on heart, that the  dangers to pilot and passenger health of engine oil fumes entering aircraft cabins were  dramatically exaggerated and very rare. But eventually I agreed to meet two former airline  pilots who had suffered damage and lost their careers to aerotoxic syndrome. I had,  however, met others before and had not been convinced, so what made the difference this  time? Tristan Loraine and Susan Michaelis provided me with the technical data and  evidence of something that had been going on for years – about 50 years. They informed  me about the chemicals involved, the ongoing biochemical research into the damage these  can cause to humans, the fume event occurrences and what makes them happen, and the  human stories of pilots and cabin crew affected. And through them I met a network of  aeromedical specialists and biochemists who were studying the issue in detail. Then I  started asking questions again in the industry, but I was much better informed this time.  No aircraft or aero-engine manufacturer denies that fumes from engine oil can get into  cockpits and cabins, nor do they deny that these ‘fume events’ happen from time to time.  They do not deny either that these engine oils contain organophosphate materials that can  cause neurological damage in humans. The oil containers even have warnings on them to  that effect. The reason the industry and its government backers can keep the lid on this  issue is that the burden of proof about the damage these fumes can cause rests with the  victims. The industry answers charges about health damage by denial and dissembling,  which the system lets them do because of the rules about where the burden of proof lies.  The industry’s lawyers are masters of technical points of law that enable them to claim that  the victims have no legal proof of the connection between Aerotoxic Syndrome a fume  event and the symptoms that the victims suffer as a result. The lawyers can argue that the  cause might lie elsewhere in the victim’s life, or in their metabolism, and this ‘negative’  allegation is very difficult to disprove. There is a precise parallel here between the legal  war fought for years between the tobacco industry and damaged smokers and the medical  world who were looking for the proof of a connection between tobacco smoking and lung  cancer. Everybody knew that there was a connection, but the burden of proof was with the  victims, and until a precise biomarker could establish that the cancer was initiated by the 

effects of tobacco-based chemicals in specific individuals who smoked, the industry could  go on denying. The only difference between these two cases is one of scale. The health  effects of tobacco affected billions of people worldwide, whereas although aircraft fume  events happen regularly, they only occur once every several hundred flights. And when  they do, some individuals are affected while others are not, because of metabolic  differences between individual humans and the frequency of exposure that any individual  suffers. The fact that fewer people are involved makes it easier for the industry and  government to continue the denial, and more difficult for those damaged to seek any form  of redress – or even acknowledgement of their medical condition. It means ordinary  doctors are kept in ignorance of the syndrome and its symptoms, making misdiagnosis  more likely. The fact is that, for those who are affected, the effect of aerotoxic syndrome on  their lives can be devastating. For that reason, it is obscene that the industry washes its  hands of the issue, and even worse that governments collude, because there are ways of  reducing or even eliminating the risk of airborne fume events. But while denial exists and  governments collude with the manufacturers and airlines, these remedies will not be  applied. That is what this book is about.  

David Learmount,  

Operations and safety editor, Flight International 

It is on record that Carbon Monoxide (CO) sensors were used in RAF fighters in 1941 during  WW2 so for sensors to be first available in public transport jets over 80 years later  demonstratesthe averseness for governments and aircraft manufacturers to allow the flying  public to know what is in cabin air. 

Since 2006, much emphasis has been put on organophosphate (OP) chemical exposure being responsible for public ill health, but over the past 20 years OP’s have been downgraded to  ‘irritant’ chemicals rather than ‘deadly’ which was how they were classified when I was an  aerial crop spraying pilot in the 1980’s and few scientists or even specialist aviation doctors  are aware either of the presence of OP’s in jet engine oil as an anti-wear additive or the  illness. 

However, more recently the invisible, odourless, colourless, tasteless, deadly gas of carbon  monoxide (CO) has been suggested as being present in contaminated air in aircraft as this can  cause acute and chronic public ill health symptoms which a well-documented, published  Boeing 727 oil fume event flight of 22 September 1992 with the following acute symptoms  over the first 14 days but the illness has continued chronically for over 25 years for US Flight  Attendant Deanne de Witte Freise: 

In Flight – All four flight attendants reported illness, Passengers reported nausea and  headaches. Symptoms: CNS-anaesthesia, acute respiratory, acute neuromuscular, acute  confusion. 

5 Hours ER: Probable Inhalation Injury Diagnosis Notes: Nausea, headaches, tunnel vision,  legs weak and heavy, fasciculations, back and neck pain, shakes, spasms, abdominal  cramping, needles and tingles, skin burning hot, burning chest, hot flashes, ears, ringing,  joint pain. 

16 Hours ER Record: cognitive problems, disoriented, memory and concentration. disoriented, slurred speech and stammering, headache, nausea, dizziness, blurred vision,  sweating, Carbon Monoxide Level 2.5 

20 Hours Internist Doctor: ataxia, inability to coordinate thumb and finger, inability to  subtract 7 serially from 100, inability to remember 3 digits, Diagnosis: organic brain  syndrome beyond acute anxiety – Toxic Encephalopathy. 

Day 2 Lost sense of humour, Personality gone, Couldn’t match socks, Retarded, Muscle  spasms, Wandering, agitated, angry at forgetfulness, Falling up and down stairs, Balance  gone, Black chemical diarrhoea. 

Day 3 Son found mother could not turn on washing machine- EMTs were called, Neurologist  documents toxic encephalopathy with significant cognitive dysfunction, Organic brain  syndrome, small white rash on face and neck, Weak right lower extremity, Memory loss, Speech disorder. 

Day 5 Reads paper but does not retain anything, Increasing weakness and involvement of  neck muscles and eye muscles, Head falls to the right. 

Day 8 and 9 Increased weakness of arms and legs, Stumbling when walking, Muscle twitches,  Neck pain, Manual dexterity decreased, Fuzzy vision, Hair loss, Cognitive disorientation. Day 10 Neuropsychologist indicated cognitive problems consistent with Toxic  Encephalopathy and recommends specific cognitive remediation. 

Day 14 Unstable, Drift of right arm and leg, Confusion, Visual problems, Headaches, Joint  pain, Using words wrong, Generalized weakness, Difficulty reading because words tend to  jump on the page. 

The 2019 US Cabin Air Safety Act made specific reference to the introduction of CO  monitors: 

Horizon Scan of the Disease Market for 2021 published by BC Legal of Southend listed  aerotoxic Syndrome first: disease-market-for-2021 


Despite all previously published evidence since the 1950’s, there is still a claim of ‘no  positive evidence’ of Aerotoxic Syndrome and attempting to communicate with public  authorities who are accountable has become challenging as they generally answer with silence. 

It is also more challenging to know exactly which ‘evidence’ to produce as over the past 17  years as countless members of the public, family and friends have also known about this public health issue and find it equally difficult to know how to handle it or how it will end. 

Therefore, in 2015 I contacted the Norfolk Police to put evidence on the public record and  since then have kept in touch with a Staff Officer who has a record of events and evidence and will be sent a copy of this formally witnessed Public Statement. 

One of the main difficulties that I have encountered has been that my Member of Parliament  since 2015, Clive Lewis of Norwich South, has refused to communicate – not only with me  but other constituents about this ‘campaign’, despite being a Labour party MP and with past  connections to Unite the Union – even though I met him in 2015 and gave him a copy of my  2014 book. 

In frustration, I wrote to the office of HM Queen in 2016 and received a reply and left  Norwich to try and find a more understanding UK MP in March 2021: aerotoxic-syndrome-to-be-officially-recognised/ 

The Guardian covered the issue on 19 August 2017: ‘There are hundreds of sick crew’ is  toxic air on planes making frequent flyers ill? flyers-ill 

Unite the Union’s 2020 position on toxic cabin air: events/news/2020/february/airlines-must-stop-buck-passing-and-take-immediate-action-on toxic-air/ 

Previously, I and the Aerotoxic Association had excellent representation from 2007 to 2010  from John Maples MP, which is all recorded. m 

Since then,several MP’s have become aware of the public health issue including Henry  Smith MP who called for a debate in 2015: 

2016 House of Commons Aerotoxic Syndrome debate: htm 

Since 2006, there has been a large amount of ‘peer reviewed’ international research into  Aerotoxic Poisoning yet after each study ‘Further research’ is recommended.  

To date, chemical contaminants such as CO have been identified but still the levels or doses  in a visible oil fume event have not been openly published and no researcher has ever yet  asked for any evidence from the Aerotoxic Association. 

Nearly 16 years later, I know I have discovered an inconvenient cause of mass public ill  health with deliberately harmful medicine, questionable science, and huge amounts of money. 

I have in recent weeks reasoned that it is best to write an updated formal public Statement of  truth as I am exhausted, embarrassed and have ‘run out of words’ and to then remain silent,  except for attending any public court.


Visible oil fume event accident 5 August 2019 


260 UK legal cases are due to be judged at the UK Royal Courts of Justice from March 2022. 

The 17th annual GCAQE conference will be 14-15 September 2022: 

ACES sensors are already in use by a major US airline and low-cost personal CO data  loggers are available for aircrew and passengers, it is reasoned that it is only a matter of time  before attorneys call for evidence in the form of data which has been recorded – both of the  levels of contaminants present in cabin air and of their duration. 

For example, Carbon Monoxide records will be available in the future from oil fume event  flights such as XLA 120. 

8 January 2022: “Strong Chemical Odor On Alaska Airlines Plane Sends Two Flight  Attendants to the Hospital” 

“So-called ‘smoke, odor, or fume’ events, as they are known in the industry, are sometimes  referred to as ‘toxic fume events’ because of the devastating impact that they can reportedly  have on the short and long term health of those exposed to one”. plane-sends-two-flight-attendants-to-the 

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